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Gilbert makes a case against those who would downplay the importance of emotion 
on the grounds that (a) both reason and emotion can become unbalanced (“out of 
control”); (b) emotion is needed for good decision-making; and (c) the rejection of 
emotion is deeply implicated within the practices of patriarchy. 
 In reading the paper for this response, I was most struck by the way that 
disciplinary perspectives inform the problems that we see when we come to the 
study of argumentation. Some established paradigm emerges in scholarship and 
proclaims that “everything is X,” pressing everyone to pay attention to X. The next 
move, of course, is to problematize that global claim, and demand attention to Y, as a 
curious way of not being X. 
 Coming at argumentation studies from a discipline that tends to put 
propositions (logic) and propositional attitudes (epistemology) at the center of 
attention, Gilbert in opposition sees the problem as one of carving out space for 
curiously non-propositional materials like emotions. 
 By contrast, the disciplinary tradition of rhetoric puts civic deliberations at 
the center of attention. Within what Kenneth Burke termed the Barnyard of our civic 
life, emotions and their close cousins moods, desires, passions, interests, 
preferences, motives, perspectives, climates of opinion and worldviews obviously 
reign supreme. They are, to use Gilbert’s word, “permeative.” As the early American 
orator Fisher Ames proclaimed, “the only constant agents in political affairs are the 
passions of men.” Thus the original studiers of civic deliberations wrote treatises of 
rhetoric focused just on appeals to emotion (Aristotle, Rhetoric, I.1). So when those 
of us from rhetorical and allied communication fields come to the study of 
argumentation, we often see the problem as one of carving room out of all this 
emotion-stuff for the curious activity of giving good reasons. 
 Aristotle’s own treatise of rhetoric focused largely on the possibilities of 
logos (as well as aiming to establish ethos as a distinct form of rhetorical appeal, not 
just a mild sort of pathos, Fortenbaugh, 1992). In contemporary argumentation 
studies, Scott Jacobs has adopted a similar approach. According to his seminal 
“Rhetoric and Dialectic from the Standpoint of Normative Pragmatics” (2000), the 
study of argumentation must attend to “the contingencies, possibilities and limits of 
actual situations” characterized by “limited information, imagination and time, 
questionable motive, vested interest, complex social arrangements, and so forth” (p. 
274)—a list that Jacobs would undoubtedly be willing to extend to include 
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emotions. One key task of argumentation theory is to explain how these possibly 
good-reason-unfriendly “actual situations” can be reconstructed by the arguers in 
order put themselves “in a position to decide if claims should be reasonably 
accepted or rejected” (p. 274). We need to find out how argumentative discourse 
manages “to encourage mutual, voluntary, free, comprehensive, open, fair, impartial, 
considered, reasoned, informed, reflective, and involved engagement” (p. 274) even 
within the cacophonous Barnyard. 
 The essays which have been filling out this normative pragmatic program for 
argumentation studies do not aim to show how reason can overcome emotion. 
Rather, the focus is on how argumentative discourse can create a situation in which 
a normatively appropriate complex of reasons and emotions (and other features) 
prevails. There are several possibilities worth considering. 
 On one hand, emotional appeals can create circumstances in which an giving 
good reasons can begin to be productive. Jacobs himself goes on to analyze a quite 
strident emotional appeal, and concludes that “here and in many other 
controversies emotional appeals can play a constructive role in deliberation and 
may be positively required by the situation” (p. 277). He explains: 
 
Among other situations, there are those where an audience does not take seriously 
the urgency or moral gravity of the problems addressed by an advocate but they 
should. Under these circumstances effective emotional appeals may not degrade the 
deliberative capacities of an audience; they may enhance them. Likewise, 
expressions of incredulity and moral outrage may be practical necessities just to be 
able to re-open what much of the public takes to be an already decided issue and 
just to lay claim to having a legitimate standpoint in the first place” (p. 277). 
 
 On the other hand, giving good reasons can be a necessary component of a 
legitimate appeal to emotion. Beth Innocenti has explored how this works in a series 
of useful articles. In her account (2011), an appeal to fear encourages action by 
creating a situation in which auditors may be criticized for inattention and lack of 
public spirit if they do not respond quickly and appropriately to a speaker’s dire 
warnings. At the same time, however, in making a fear appeal the speaker is putting 
her own public standing at risk; she has to defend her right to arouse the auditors’ 
emotions by offering good arguments for the impending threat. Appeals to shame 
have a similar structure (2007); a speaker can help her audience see that their 
behaviour is rightfully characterized as shameful, but only at the cost of undertaking 
to support that charge with good reasons. 
 Central to all this work is a basic understanding that the giving of good 
reasons is an important enough activity to deserve distinguishing from all the other 
activities that are happening in argumentative discourse. We even bite the bullet 
and call a good reason that gets given by its ordinary name, argument. Jacobs (2000) 
urges us to accept a characterization of arguments as 
 
fundamentally linguistic entities that express with a special pragmatic force 
propositions, where those propositions stand in particular inferential relations to 
one another. If you cannot explicate from a message such propositional assemblies 
and modes of expression, the message is not an argument. (p. 264) 
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Or to put it in simpler and traditional terms, an argument has been made when 
some discourse openly displays a premise/conclusion structure—a reason. Why is it 
worth characterizing arguments this narrowly? Because, as Jacobs (2000) explains, 
“arguments have some distinctive properties—properties that are crucial to their 
privileged status as modes of gaining warranted assent, reasoned adherence, 
voluntary and informed acceptance” (p. 264). And in addition to warranting assent, 
good reasons give us the tools to critique unexamined, unstated or actively occluded 
assumptions; they allow us to gain increased clarity about what we are talking 
about; they grant legitimacy to claims that might otherwise be dismissed; and they 
are uttered in the enduring (however counterfactual) hope that others—everyone—
will eventually see reason.  
 So, speaking from the normative pragmatic perspective, Gilbert’s call for 
students of argumentation to attend to more cognitive/affective attitudes than just 
belief is welcome (see Pinto 2009, 2010). Also welcome is his insistence on 
examining arguments in their full contexts, including the context of the emotional 
states from which they are spoken and in which they are heard (see Jacobs 1999, 
quoting Austin: “the total speech act in the total speech situation is the only actual 
phenomenon which, in the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating”). But a goal of 
“reintegrating emotion and reason,” or establishing “emotional argument;” that we 
find less compelling. It is precisely the fact that “emotion is permeative” which 
renders so curious the small but unique contributions that giving good reasons 
makes to our civic life. 
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